Shareholders\u27 Agreements for Closely Held Corporations: Special Tools for Special Circumstances by Ghingher, John J., III
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 4
Issue 2 Spring 1975 Article 3
1975
Shareholders' Agreements for Closely Held
Corporations: Special Tools for Special
Circumstances
John J. Ghingher III
Saul Ewing LLP
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ghingher, John J. III (1975) "Shareholders' Agreements for Closely Held Corporations: Special Tools for Special Circumstances,"
University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 4: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol4/iss2/3
SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS FOR CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS: SPECIAL TOOLS FOR
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
John J. Ghinger, Ilt
In planning for the closely held corporation, counsel should give
consideration to the flexibility afforded by a shareholders' agree-
ment. Such an agreement is not, however, without its pitfalls. The
author examines the advantages and problems inherent in the use
of a shareholders' agreement.
The small, closely held corporation is one of the most common business
units in American commerce. Corporations of this type are continuously
being formed, liquidated and dissolved. It is the formation, sustenance
and termination of these fundamental commercial units that confronts the
corporate lawyer with some of the most basic and, at the same time, unique,
planning opportunities. These planning opportunities arise primarily
because of the virtual identity between the business considerations of the
small corporation and the personal financial considerations of its sharehold-
ers. Although the small, closely held corporation is, in the eyes of the law,
an independent entity, separate and distinct from its shareholders, the
fortunes of the corporation and those of its shareholders are normally so
intertwined that each aspect of planning at the corporate level necessarily
has implications at the shareholder level, and vice versa.
This virtual identity between a closely held corporation and its small
number of shareholders is exemplified in, and made more complex by, the
different levels of relationship that commonly Pxist between the corporation
and its shareholders. For example, the shareholder is not only, by
definition, the proprietor of and ultimate decision maker for the corpora-
tion, but in most cases is also a director, officer and employee of the
corporation. The shareholder, as an investor, is the source of capital for the
corporation, at least initially, while the corporation, as his employer, is
often the source of the shareholder's daily living. Because the business of
the corporation is often the lifework of a shareholder, its stock is apt to
be the single most valuable asset of his personal estate.
In the face of these complex and conflicting relationships, the traditional
concepts of corporate operation through charter, by-laws, formal meetings
of shareholders and directors and the like, often prove to be of little value in
the planning context. This planning void is frequently filled by what has
become, under a number of different names1 and definitions, one of the
t A.B., 1966, Princeton University; J.D., 1969, University of Maryland; Associate, Wein-
berg and Green, Baltimore, Maryland; Editor-in-Chief, Maryland Law Review, 1968-69.
1. Shareholders' agreements are called by a number of different names, depending upon the
goals emphasized by the specific agreement and the individual preference of its draftsman.
Some of the most common names include: "Restrictive Stock Agreement," "Buy/Sell
Agreement," or "Stock Purchase Agreement."
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most flexible planning tools available to close corporations-the sharehold-
ers' agreement.
This type of agreement is invariably addressed to the solution of one or
more of the infinite problems which are generated by the identity crisis
implicit in the maze of corporate-shareholder relationships described
above. For example, such an.agreement can provide continuity in the
shareholder group by restricting the transfer of shares of stock; it can
provide liquidity in the personal estates of the shareholders through the use
of death buy/our arrangements; it can provide the mechanics for passing
control from one generation of shareholders to another; and, it can, when
employed at the formation of the corporation, embody a number of basic
decisions and policies with respect to the structure and management of the
newly-formed entity.
While the shareholders' agreement is among the most useful planning
tools available to counsel for a closely held corporation, it also, because of
the factors described above, presents him with some of the most difficult
conceptual problems he will have to face, both substantively and ethically.
This article will examine, on a practical level, some of the special problems
inherent in the preparation of shareholders' agreements.
BASIC GOALS AND PRELIMINARY PROBLEMS
Most shareholders' agreements are conceived and drafted with a view
toward achieving one or more of the following basic goals, all of which are
peculiar to closely held corporations and stem from the fundamental
identity between such corporations and their shareholders:
1. To assure continuity in the management of the corporation and in the
ability of the shareholders to exercise their management powers, at the
various levels of shareholder, director and officer, without interference from
new shareholders who become members of the shareholder group without
their consent. This goal is normally accomplished by provisions imposing
restrictions upon the voluntary transfer of the corporation's stock and
creating devices for the retrieval of such stock from persons or entities into
whose hands the stock may pass by operation of law or by some other event
beyond the control of the shareholder group.
2. To provide the estates of the shareholders with markets for their stock
after their death, thereby providing the estates with liquidity to pay death
taxes and expenses and to purchase investment assets which may be more
appropriate to the estate portfolio than the stock of a closely held
corporation and, at the same time, fixing the estate taxes payable with
respect to their stock at a manageable level. This goal is normally achieved
by providing for the purchase of a shareholder's stock at his death.
3. To establish and to assure the continuation of certain basic policies
with respect to the operation of the corporation, especially in the significant
areas of the payment of dividends and the election of officers and directors.
Although shareholders' agreements frequently have other goals, these
three basic goals are the most common, and the problems which hinder the
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achievement of these basic goals are the ones with which the corporate
lawyer is frequently faced when preparing a shareholders' agreement.
One of the very first problems confronting the draftsmen of a sharehold-
ers' agreement relates to the identity of the parties to the agreement, which
can have serious effect upon the validity of the agreement. If the parties
include all of the shareholders of the corporation, the validity of the
agreement will probably be upheld, assuming no specific provision is
invalid for other reasons and assuming the absence of fraud and duress.
2
However, if less than all of the shareholders of the corporation are to be
parties, the agreement's validity can be jeopardized depending on the
specific goals which it attempts to achieve. The courts traditionally have
been suspicious of shareholders' agreements involving less than all of a
corporation's shareholders because of the potential use of such agreements
to abuse the rights of minority shareholders.
3
Although the mere fact that all shareholders are not parties should not by
itself invalidate the agreement, this fact will limit the tools available to the
draftsman in achieving the basic goals of the agreement. For example, such
agreements may be vulnerable to attack by minority shareholders if they
attempt to use the income or assets of the corporation to effect purchases of
stock of parties to the agreement, particularly where the purchase price is
excessive. Such an agreement may also be vulnerable if it attempts to affect
ongoing corporate policy with respect to dividends, election of officers and
directors, and the like, especially if such policies noticeably favor the
parties to the agreement as opposed to shareholders who are not parties.
The careful draftsman should, whenever possible, obtain the consent of
non-party shareholders if implementation of any provision of the agreement
could potentially have an effect adverse to their interests.
Another preliminary problem for the lawyer preparing a shareholders'
agreement can arise on an ethical level. In most cases, the lawyer repre-
senting the corporation will prepare the agreement as part of his respon-
sibility as general corporate counsel. But in many situations, that lawyer
2. The controversy concerning the general validity of shareholders' agreements arises
primarily in areas where the agreement seeks to pool or allocate the voting rights of the
shareholders or to establish management policies for the corporation. The unanimity of a
shareholders' agreement removes many of the concerns which make agreements of this
type potentially obnoxious. See generally 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 5.24 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as O'NEAL]. Unanimity does not, however, prevent specific provisions of
an agreement from being declared invalid where they transgress statutory provisions,
violate common law rules or constitute or result in some breach of the fiduciary obligations
among shareholders.
3. See, e.g., Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E.2d 439 (1946); Christal v. Petry, 90
N.Y.S.2d 620 (App. Div. 1949).
The tendency of the courts to sustain a unanimous shareholder agreement is,
perhaps, due to the fact that there is less possibility that it will be used as an
instrument of fraud or oppression against minority shareholders. On the other hand,
agreements by holders of substantially all, but not all, the shares have given ri- to
conflicting judicial interpretations. Some courts regard them as invalid, whereas
others treat them on the same basis as unanimous agreements. The trend of recent
decisions is to disregard inconsequential holdings in determining the validity of
shareholder agreements.




of his firm also represents the individual shareholders with respect to their
estate planning or other personal legal matters, so that the individual
shareholders may not have independent personal counsel. In situations
such as this, the lawyer preparing the agreement will find himself called
upon to give advice not only as to which provisions of the agreement will be
in the best interests of the corporation, but also as to how these provisions
can benefit the shareholders as individuals. The inherent potential for con-
flict of interest in this situation is obvious.
Fortunately, the problem is often obviated by the fact that each
shareholder, depending upon eventualities which cannot be foreseen at the
time the agreement is being prepared, may ultimately be on either side of
the transactions contemplated by the agreement. For example, in most
cases, no shareholder will be able to anticipate, with respect to a provision
calling for the purchase of the stock of a deceased .shareholder, whether it
will be his stock which will be purchased or whether he will be one of the
surviving shareholders whose continuing efforts will be necessary to
amortize the purchase price for the stock of one of his deceased associates.
It is this uncertainty which provides the draftsman who "represents" all of
the parties with the ability to objectively conceive and prepare the
agreement without committing a breach of professional ethics.
However, in situations where the respective interests of the shareholders
and the corporation under the proposed agreement are clearly diverse and
potentially antagonistic, the parties should have independent representa-
tion. A good example of this latter situation is where, because of the re-
spective ages or health of the shareholders, one of the shareholders is
much more likely to predecease the others, thereby placing his interest
in the buy-out provision in direct opposition to those of the corporation
and the other shareholders.
In all cases, both to protect himself from potential professional liability
and to orient the shareholders toward the attitude which will produce a fair
agreement, the lawyer who is called upon to prepare a shareholders'
agreement should at the outset make the shareholders aware that each of
them may find himself on either side of a transaction contemplated by the
agreement. This awareness will not only serve to crystalize any areas where
diverse interests are present but, hopefully, will also instill in the
shareholders the objective point of view which is vital to the preparation of
an effective shareholders' agreement.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE ABILITY OF A SHAREHOLDER TO
VOLUNTARILY TRANSFER HIS STOCK
Because one of the basic goals of shareholders' agreements is to prevent
the intrusion of unwanted new shareholders, it is not surprising that the
most common feature of an agreement among shareholders of a closely held
corporation is a provision which attempts to restrict or limit the transfera-
bility of the stock owned by the parties to the agreement. Although the
significance of these provisions is probably overemphasized in light of the
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fact that shares of a closely held corporation are not readily marketable
unless they represent a controlling interest, their use is nonetheless quite
widespread. Provisions of this type vary widely in the nature of the
restrictions imposed but all must overcome one common legal obstacle-the
rule, borrowed from the law of real property, that unreasonable restrictions
upon alienation are unenforceable." Judicial interpretations as to the
"reasonableness" of restrictions vary almost as widely as the types of
restrictions employed, yet some basic conclusions can safely be drawn.
To begin with, it is certain that any absolute prohibition against transfer
will fail,' so that some form of partial restriction must be employed. The
most common forms of partial restriction are those which require, as pre-
requisite to transfer, consent by the other shareholders who are party to
the agreement and those which require a transferor to first subject the
shares to be transferred to the options of other shareholders or the corpora-
tion itself.7 The first option restriction is generally held enforceable, pro-
vided the option price does not amount to a forfeiture. 8 This type of restric-
4. Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (1949). See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d
1318 (1958); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 647 (1942); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1159 (1930). The traditional
prohibition against restraints on alienation is complementary in the corporate context to
the equally traditional attribute of the corporate form-free transferability of shares.
5. The courts begin with the concept that a restraint can be valid if it is reasonably calculated
to achieve a legitimate purpose. See Martin v. Graybar Elec. Co., 285 F.2d 619 (7th Cir.
1961). In order to determine legitimacy of purpose, the courts consider a number of factors,
the most common of which are:
(1) the size of the corporation;
(2) the degree of restraint on the power to alienate;
(3) the length of time the restriction is to remain in effect;
(4) the method to be used in determining the transfer or option price of shares
subject to the restraint;
(5) the likelihood that the restriction will contribute to the attainment of corporate
objectives;
(6) the possibility that a hostile new shareholder would cause serious injury to the
corporation;
(7) the likelihood that the restraint will promote the interests of the corporate
enterprise as a whole.
2 O'NEAL § 7.06, at 18. In the context of a closely held corporation, factors (1), (5), (6) and
(7) are almost automatically satisfied, leaving as the most significant factors those which
deal with the nature of the restraint itself.
6. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318, 1322 (1958); 65 A.L.R. 1159, 1165 (1930). Many authorities
in this area involve restrictions imposed in the corporation's charter or by-laws, but the
principle applies equally to restrictions imposed by agreement. See Hornstein, Stockhold-
ers' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1041, 1048 (1950).
7. Other forms include requirements that the directors of the corporation consent to the
transfer, prohibitions against transfers to specific classes of persons or restriction of
transfers within such a specific class. 2 ONEAL § 7.05, at 8-9.
8. Beggy v. Deike, 413 Pa. 74, 196 A.2d 179 (1963); see Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532
(5th Cir. 1951), and cases cited therein. See generally 6 CAVITCH § 114.02 [21; 2 O'NEAL §
7.09. Where the option price is equivalent to a forfeiture, a first option restriction can be
tantamount to an absolute restraint. A good way to avoid the possibility of attack on the
basis of the amount of the purchase price is to make the option price identical to that of-
ferred by the purchaser to whom the stock is proposed to be transferred. Care should be
taken, however, to prevent the transferring shareholder from taking advantage of a collu-
sive offer from a third party in order to obtain an inflated price for his stock. It should be
noted that, in spite of the above considerations, a first option restraint requiring a tender
of stock for $1.00 per share when the actual value was $1,060 per share or more was up-
held as reasonable In re Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963).
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tion is most often employed for this reason. More uncertainty clouds the
enforceability of consent restrictions, however, because of the complete
frustration of a proposed transfer which can result from a refusal to con-
sent.9 While the exercise of first option restrictions simply substitutes the
corporation or other shareholders as the purchaser of shares proposed for
transfer, a refusal of consent pQses a complete barrier to transfer. There-
fore, the consent restraint is more vulnerable to an attack founded upon the
favored policy of free alienation. This vulnerability becomes particularly
acute where the restrictive provision requires the unanimous consent of the
other shareholders, thus permitting a single shareholder to preclude a pro-
posed transfer with what amounts to a veto. Although recent cases tend to
recognize the validity of consent restrictions, 10 controversy persists among
the various jurisdictions as to their enforceability and, therefore, their use
invites the prospect of litigation.
The Maryland cases are silent upon the question of enforceability of
transfer restrictions imposed by agreement. 2 Although it may be assumed
that absolute restrictions are taboo, the choice between restrictions
involving consent and those creating first options is not facilitated by any
pertinent judicial ruling. Parallel authority with respect to consent restric-
tions is provided by the Maryland close corporation statute, which
legislatively restricts transfers of stock in corporations incorporated under
the act to those consented to by all other stockholders. 13 Unfortunately, the
legislative history underlying this statutory restriction 14 does not resolve the
dilemma faced by those interpreting the statute as to whether the legislat-
ture adopted the restrictions merely as a codification of common law or as
an exception to a general common law rule which would otherwise invalidate
restrictions of this type. The latter interpretation is supported by the fact
9. "Until about 1920, the courts here almost without exception held that any restriction
conditioning the power of a shareholder to dispose of his shares on the consent of some
other person was an invalid restraint on the alienability of the shares." 2 O'NEAL § 7.08, at
34.
10. Colbert v. Hennessey, 351 Mass. 131, 217 N.E.2d 914 (1966); 6 CAVITCH § 114.02 [2], at 17.
11. Compare Colbert v. Hennessey, 351 Mass. 131, 217 N.E.2d 914 (1966) with Tracey v.
Franklin, 30 Del. Ch. 407, 61 A.2d 780 (1948).
12. A by-law restriction requiring a shareholder to submit his stock to the o]ptions of the other
shareholders before transferring it to a third party has been declared invalid as "an
unreasonable and palpable restraint upon the alienation of property." Victor G. Bloede
Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 141-42 (1896). It is unlikely, however, that this ruling would
prevail today in light of the overwhelming modern authority to the contrary in other
jurisdictions. In Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 VA.
L. REV. 229 (1951), the author stated that Bloede was the only case he could find in which
first option restrictions were held invalid.
13. No transfer of the stock of a close corporation shall be valid unless: (1) such
transfer has been consented to no more than three months prior to the date of the
transfer by all stockholders of the corporation by a signed written instrument; or (2)
such transfer is made pursuant to a provision of a stockholders' agreement
authorized by Section 104 of this subtitle requiring the purchase of stock by, or the
offer of stock to (i) the corporation, or (ii) one or more of its stockholders, or (iii) one
or more persons named in such agreement.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 101(a) (1973). See also Hall, The New Maryland Close
Corporation Law, 27 MD. L. REV. 341 (1967).
14. See generally COMMISSION ON REVISION OF CORPORATE LAWS OF MARYLAND, FINAL REPORT
(Dec. 15, 1966).
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that this statutory recognition of consent restrictions was enacted as an
integral part of a special legislative scheme favoring small corporations and
is not available to corporations not electing to be governed by all provisions
of the act.' 5
The only broad legislative mention of restrictions against transfer
appears in Section 27(c) of the Maryland Corporation Law, 1 6 which requires
notice of any applicable restrictions on the face of stock certificates, and in
Section 8-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code,"7 which contains a similar
requirement. The effect of these provisions is simply to prevent the
enforcement of restrictions without proper notice against bona fide purchas-
ers of the restricted shares. These sections fail to enlighten as to the
underlying lawfulness of various restrictions, although their enactment
implies that at least some types of restrictions are lawful. 8
Although restrictions on transferability are normally desirable, there are
situations where a shareholders' agreement should permit unrestricted
transfers of certain limited types. For example, a common estate planning
device employed by shareholders who are conscious of heavy potential es-
tate taxes is to remove assets from their estates by inter vivos gifts to the
ultimate objects of their bounty. In many cases, the principal asset of the
estate of a shareholder of a closely held corporation is the stock of that
corporation. Consequently, to preserve this estate planning alternative,
shareholders' agreements often permit, as exceptions to the provisions
15. Compare the recently enacted provision of the DEL CODE ANN. § 8-202 (1967), which
specifically recognizes as valid several different forms of restriction, including first option
restrictions, consent restrictions, mandatory purchase restrictions, restrictions prohibiting
transfers to certain persons or classes of persons (if the designation of persons or classes is
not "manifestly unreasonable"), and "any other lawful restriction on transfer." This
statutory provision applies to all corporations under Delaware's General Corporation Law.
16. Every certificate representing shares which are restricted or limited as to
transferability by the corporation issuing such shares shall either (i) set forth upon
the face or back of the certificate a full statement of such restriction or limitation or
(ii) state that the corporation will furnish such a statement upon request and
without charge to any holder of such shares. Nothing in this paragraph shall be
deemed to affect the provisions of Section 8-204 of Article 95B.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 27(c) (1973).
17. Unless conspicuously noted on the security, a restriction on transfer imposed by
the issuer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except against a person with
actual knowledge of it.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 8-204 (1964). It is noteworthy that neither MD. ANN. CODE art.
23, § 27(c) (1973) nor this provision apply to restrictions imposed by private agreement
between shareholders. Both sections refer to restrictions imposed by the issuing corpora-
tion. Arguably at least, the statutory notice would be required for restrictions which are
imposed under a shareholders' agreement to which the issuing corporation is a party. See
MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 8-204 (1964), Comment 4. Regardless of the application of these
statutes, a legend on certificates representing stock restricted by agreement should always
be employed to ensure that a transferee has sufficient notice of the applicable restrictions.
Failure to do so may render the restrictions unenforceable at common law against a
transferee without actual notice thereof and, in some jurisdictions; unenforceable without
regard to the actual knowledge of the transferee. See 6 CAVITCH § 113.02 [3].
18. Although the statutory language implies that restrictions may be valid and enforceable,
the following clarification is made:
The present section in no way laters the prevailing case law which recognizes free
alienability as an inherent attribute of securities and holds invalid unreasonable
restraints on alienation ....
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 8-204 (1964), Comment 2.
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restricting transferability, inter vivos transfers of stock to a shareholder's
spouse, children, grandchildren or other close relatives or to trusts for the
benefit of these relatives. Similarly, it is not uncommon that a shareholder
may have a relative who is active in the business and who is acceptable to
the other shareholders as a successor to that shareholder's ownership in-
terest. Here again, it is usually desirable for the transfer restrictions of a
shareholders' agreement to except transfers to such a relative.
Where exceptions of this type are employed, care should be taken that the
permitted transfers do not frustrate the basic goals of the agreement. For
example, if an agreement requires the purchase of shareholder's stock at his
death, any provision permitting inter vivos transfers for estate planning
purposes should require the purchase of all shares held by the transferee
upon the death of the transferring shareholder. Otherwise, the remaining
shareholders will be forced to effect a purchase of the stock of the deceased
shareholder, but will be obliged to continue to include his donees in the
shareholder group. Further, each permitted transferee should be subjected
to the same transfer restrictions as the original shareholders so that a
permitted transfer will not indirectly result in a circumvention of the
desired restrictions. Because it may not be possible to enforce the
applicable provisions against a permitted transferee who is not party to the
agreement, it is wise to require, as a condition precedent to a permitted
transfer, that such transferee become a signatory to the agreement.' 9
RETRIEVAL OF STOCK INVOLUNTARILY PASSING OUT OF THE
SHAREHOLDER GROUP
While transfer restrictions are normally sufficient to prevent voluntary
transfers of stock to outsiders, an entirely different problem is posed by the
prospect of shares changing hands on an involuntary basis. The events
which can cause such an involuntary transfer are numerous. The shares
which are pledged as collateral for personal loans to a shareholder can be
sold or retained by lenders in the event of the shareholder's default. A
shareholder can become the object of bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings
which may pass his personal assets to a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy.
The shares of a disabled or incompetent shareholder can become subject to
the control of his guardian. Finally, the death of a shareholder will cause his
shares to come under the control of his personal representatives and,
ultimately, to pass to his legatees. In each of these cases, the result is the
same, the remaining shareholders will be obliged to deal with an outsider
when formulating corporate policy subsequent to the transfer. Of course,
the significance of this result varies with the size of the stockholdings which
are involuntarily transferred, but in the case of most closely held corpora-
tions, involuntary transfers can cause significant management difficulties.
19. In Matthews v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), the court indicated
that the restrictions imposed by the shareholders' agreement involved in that case applied
to permitted transferees with notice in spite of the absence of a clause specifically binding
them, because a contrary holding would frustrate the "critical function" of the agreement.




To assure the basic purpose of continuity in the shareholder group, the
shareholders' agreement must provide some contractual method for the
retrieval of stock which has passed out of the shareholder group by reason of
one of the events described above. In most cases, the appropriate contrac-
tual method is that which is also employed to restrict voluntary transfers,
that is, to provide the corporation or the other shareholders with options to
purchase involuntarily transferred stock. However, the involuntary nature
of the transfer can cause special problems which do not arise in the
voluntary transfer situation. The first problem stems from the fact that the
transfer will usually occur prior to the implementation of the option
provisions. As a result, the party exercising option rights, whether corpora-
tion or shareholder, will be faced with the prospect of enforcing the option
against the transferee. In most cases, the transferee will be bound if the
certificates are properly legended to provide notice of the options. However,
where the transferee is a trustee in bankruptcy, the power of the trustee to
disav6w executory contracts2" can pose a serious obstacle to the enforce-
ment of the option provision.
Some draftsmen try to circumvent this latter problem by providing in the
agreement that the stock of a bankrupt or insolvent shareholder shall be
deemed automatically purchased by the corporation or the shareholders at
some time prior to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings. Although the
validity of such a provision is questionable because of the retrospective
nature of its application, a provision of this type appears to be the only
contractual method for avoiding the disavowal problem. On a more
practical level, the most effective way to ensure the retrieval of shares from
a trustee in bankruptcy is to provide for an option price which will enable
the trustee to realize fair value for the shares on terms which are favorable
from the point of view of satisfying the claims of the bankrupt shareholder's
creditors. The efficacy of this practical safeguard is reinforced by the fact,
mentioned earlier,21 that shares of stock of a closely held corporation are not
readily marketable unless they represent majority control, so that a trustee
in bankruptcy will normally be more than happy to honor an option
provision containing a reasonable purchase price and favorable payment
terms.
The possibility of an involuntary transfer of pledged stock in the event of
default on the underlying debt can be avoided in the first instance by a
provision restricting a shareholder's ability to pledge his stock. Although an
absolute prohibition against a pledge of stock could constitute an unreason-
able restraint, 22 the use of first option provisions would seem permissible.
Some form of partial restraint on the ability to pledge, such as a limit on the
portion of a shareholder's shares which can be pledged or a maximum
restriction on the size of the underlying loan, can also be effective. This
20. The trustee shall assume or reject an executory contract, including an unexpired
lease or real property, within sixty days after the adjudication or within thirty days
after the qualification of the trustee, whichever is later, but the court may for cause
shown extend or reduce the time....
Bankruptcy Act 70(b), 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
21. See p. 215 supra.
22. Id. p. 215 supra; O'NEAL § 7.05a.
19751
Baltimore Law Review
latter alternative would appear particularly attractive from the sharehold-
ers' point of view, since it would permit them to enjoy some economic
benefit from their shares during their lifetimes. In reality, however, shares
of a closely held corporation, unless they represent majority control, are not
often accepted as collateral by lending institutions, so that a restriction on
the ability to pledge will not be onerous in most situations.
Another problem arises in orporations in which all shareholders serve
actively as employees. In such a situation, the permanent disability, resig-
nation or retirement of a shareholder may cause problems with respect to
the continuity of management quite similar to those caused by stock pass-
ing into the hands of an outsider. Problems of this nature are most likely
to arise in service businesses where the active participation of each share-
holder in the business contributes to the level of corporate income. The
shareholders who continue to participate will naturally be reluctant to see
the fruits of their efforts continue to inure to the benefit of the shareholder
who, because of his resignation, retirement or disability, can no longer
contribute to corporate growth. Even in businesses which are not service
oriented, the retirement, resignation or permanent disability of a share-
holder immediately puts his interests potentially at odds with those of the
shareholders who continue to participate. For example, the shareholder
who is no longer active will not fully participate in compensation and may
begin to view his stock as a potential income producing asset, while the
shareholders who remain active may be reluctant to distribute large por-
tions of the corporation's earnings in the form of dividends.
Although the divisive potential of this situation can be limited by
carefully planned deferred compensation arrangements and disability wage
continuation programs, the most foolproof method for avoiding the inherent
problems caused by the retirement, resignation or permanent disability of a
shareholder is to provide in the shareholders' agreement for a purchase of
his shares, either on a mandatory or optional basis. 23 Mandatory purchase
provisions are probably the most desirable, because they assure the retired
or disabled shareholder a source of funds in the form of the purchase price
for his stock and, at the same time, relieve the remaining shareholders of
potential management difficulties arising from the presence of a non-active
shareholder. 24 However, mandatory buy-out provisions can be troublesome
if triggered by the resignation of a shareholder, since they permit a
shareholder to time his resignation in such a way as to force a purchase of
his stock at a time when the valuation provisions of the agreement will yield
the highest purchase price.2 5 Additionally, the shareholders may find it
obnoxious that a resigning shareholder can force a purchase of his stock and
23. See generally O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations, 65
HARV. L. REV. 773, 796-97 (1952).
24. Where permanent disability or retirement are to be triggering events, these terms should
be defined carefully to insure that the mandatory provisions operate fairly.
25. This problem would not arise where the purchase price under the agreement was fixed at
an unchanging figure. See pp. 224-34 infra.
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use the proceeds to finance a competing business.2 6 In such circumstances,
an optional purchase may be appropriate.
PROVISIONS DEALING WITH CORPORATE ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT
At some stage in the development of a corporation, normally at or just
prior to its organization, the shareholders may wish to make certain
agreements among themselves to assure the establishment and continuity
of specific corporate policies. Although as a group the shareholders can
continuously assure such policies through their control of the board of
directors, such an agreement is often desirable from the point of view of a
minority shareholder to prevent a majority shareholder, or a combination of
shareholders constituting a majority, from departing from the desired
policies or from adopting new policies contrary to the interest of the
minority. Agreements of this type are also useful when the shareholders are
not familiar with one another and wish to negotiate and reach agreement
concerning the prevailing corporate policies prior to incorporation.
When such an agreement is prepared prior to incorporation it can reflect
the agreement of the contracting parties as to the terms to be included in
the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the corporation, such as the
purposes of incorporation, the structure of the corporation's capitalization,
the presence or absence of pre-emptive rights, the number of votes required
for certain types of corporate action, the applicability of cumulative voting,
the number of directors and the names of the initial directors, the
corporation's fiscal year, the number, titles and duties of corporate officers
and similar organizational matters. Initial agreement can also be reached
with respect to the advisability of electing Subchapter S27 status or
qualifying as a Maryland Close Corporation. 28 Furthermore, such an initial
agreement can contain provisions imposing transfer restrictions, death
buy-out provisions and provisions dealing with other subject matter de-
scribed elsewhere in this article. When used in this manner, the pre-incor-
poration agreement is an extremely useful planning tool simply because its
negotiation and preparation forces the shareholders to focus upon and
resolve many of the organizational problems of incorporation and avoids the
tendency of most incorporators to employ canned forms as the basic
corporate documents without giving careful thought to their contents.
The subject matter discussed thus far can be incorporated into sharehold-
ers' agreements without transgressing any legal boundaries other than those
discussed previously. It is only when the agreement begins to treat matters
which traditionally fall within the continuing discretion of the board of
directors that legal problems can arise. These problems arise most
26. This prospect can be avoided, at least temporarily, by a noncompetition covenant having
reasonable limitations as to time and territory.
27. See pp. 234-40 infra.
28. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-11 (1973).
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frequently when shareholders seek by agreement to formulate lasting
corporate policy in two areas which are, as a matter of basic corporate law,
the perogative of the board of directors: (1) the selection, tenure and
compensation of corporate officers; and (2) the formulation of dividend
policy.
Although the validity of provisions in shareholders agreements which
attempt to formulate lasting policies in these areas depend primarily upon
the extent to which the discretion of the board of directors has been
emasculated, it is clear that the prevailing judicial authorities will not
permit total pre-emption of these areas by provisions in shareholders'
agreements. 29 Application of these authorities in the context of the closely
held corporation appears inappropriate, since, in most cases, the sharehold-
ers will themselves be the directors and officers of the corporation. This
reality has been recognized by the Maryland Close Corporation statute,
which gives shareholders broad authority to formulate management policy
within the confines of that statutory scheme. 3 However, since corporations
which do not elect close corporation status must still deal with the
traditional authorities, draftsmen of shareholders' agreements for such
corporations must be sensitive to the dangers of encroaching too extensively
upon the domain of the board of directors.
PROVISIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF STOCK UPON THE DEATH
OF A SHAREHOLDER
As has already been illustrated, one of the prevailing goals of an
agreement among shareholders is to keep the stock of the corporation, to the
extent possible, in the hands of the existing shareholder group. Yet, one way
in which stock can pass out of the favored shareholder group is through the
operation of testamentary laws and instruments. For this reason, share-
holders' agreements commonly provide a mechanism for the purchase of the
shares of a deceased stockholder, either by the corporation itself or by the
remaining shareholders.
From the standpoint of the individual shareholder, provisions of this type
are normally quite attractive. One of the great ironies of our income tax
laws is that the shareholders of a closely held corporation, and their lawyers
and accountants, normally devote much of their time and ingenuity to
devising methods by which a shareholder can extract cash from the
corporation without having that cash seriously eroded by income taxes at
both the corporate and shareholder levels and that probably the best of
those methods become available only on his death. Most of these
shareholders find that the amounts of cash which can be withdrawn in
salaries, bonuses, rents, fringe benefits and other tax deductible forms
which avoid the dreaded double tax are quite limited. They also find that
29. See 1 O'NEAL § 5.16; 6 CAVITCH § 114.03.
30. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 104-05 (1973).
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such cash-producing alternatives as sales of stock, redemptions, partial
liquidations and complete liquidations also produce significant taxable
capital gains primarily due to the low basis which most such shareholders
have in their stock. Understandably, it is with some chagrin that a
shareholder of a closely held corporation discovers, usually from his lawyer
or accountant, that probably the best tax saving alternative that he has in
this regard is to die.
This potential tax saving arises, of course, from the fact that, upon a
shareholder's death, his stock passes to his estate at a basis which equals its
fair market value at the time of his death.3 Although estate taxes take
their toll, the estate tax bite would certainly not approach the combined
capital gain and estate tax burden which a deceased shareholder would have
to pay had he sold his shares or had them redeemed prior to death. 32 Once
the shares have passed to a shareholder's estate at this "stepped-up"
basis, the prospect of an essentially tax free sale of those shares is ex-
tremely attractive. This is particularly true where the estate needs liquid-
ity for the payment of death taxes, funeral expenses and administration
costs. Since the market for such shares is, for all practical purposes, lim-
ited to the shareholder group and the corporation itself, the individual
shareholder normally welcomes a contractual provision which provides
such a market.
In structuring a death buy-out, the draftsman has three basic alterna-
tives: he can give the corporation or the remaining shareholders options to
purchase the stock; he can give the estate a "put" option which, if
exercised, would require the corporation or the remaining shareholders to
purchase the stock; or he can make the purchase mandatory upon both the
estate and the purchasing party. The purchasing party will want the
flexibility afforded by a purchase option and the shareholder will favor the
"put" option for similar reasons. Consequently, mandatory provisions are
resorted to in most situations by way of compromise, since provisions of the
mandatory variety provide the corporation and the shareholders with
assured continuity of management and interest and afford each shareholder
with a guaranteed market for his shares after death.
Another tax advantage of a death buy-out provision is that it can, if
properly conceived, establish the maximum value of the deceased share-
holder's stock for federal estate tax purposes. Although the Internal
Revenue Code and the regulations thereunder do not specifically so
provide, 33 a number of cases have held that the contractual obligation of an
estate to sell the decedent's stock to the corporation or the surviving
31. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
32. If the shares were redeemed or sold prior to death, the shareholder would be subjected
both to capital gains tax on his gain at the time of the transaction and to estate taxes on
the reinvested proceeds of the transaction upon his subsequent demise.
33. See INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 2031; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (1962). However, Treas. Reg.
20.2031-2(h) (1962) does provide that the price set forth in an agreement providing for a
mandatory purchase of stock from the estate is one of the factors to be considered in
establishing the value of that stock for estate tax purposes.
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shareholders for a bona fide purchase price will cause the maximum estate
tax value of that stock to be the contractual purchase price.3 4 The theory of
these cases is that the Internal Revenue Service cannot assess the stock at a
value higher than the contractual price because the estate cannot avail
itself of any market for the stock other than the contractual purchaser.
Using this theory, other cases have held that a mandatory death buy-out
provision will not fix the maximum estate tax value if the decedent, prior to
his death, could have disposed of his stock at a price greater than that
provided for in the agreement.3 5 Accordingly, inter vivos restrictions on
transfer must complement the death buy-out provisions if this important
tax benefit is to be attained.
Where the complete purchase or redemption of stock of a deceased
shareholder is not appropriate, because of the particular situation, but a
need for cash in the shareholder's estate is anticipated, the shareholders'
agreement can require the corporation to effect a redemption of stock held
by the shareholder's estate in amounts necessary to pay the death related
expenses and taxes described in Section 303 of the Internal Revenue Code.
A redemption of this type can, if Section 303 is applicable, be accomplished
without fear that it will be deemed by the Internal Revenue Service to be
substantially equivalent to a dividend, because Section 303 provides a safe
harbor from the dividend attack for redemptions which come within its
ambit.3 6 A provision requiring the corporation to effect a Section 303
redemption can be particularly useful where the corporation and the
remaining shareholders are financially unable to effect a complete purchase
of the deceased shareholder's interest, where the shareholders wish to make
testamentary transfers of portions of their stock to children or relatives
working in the business or where a purchase of all shares of a deceased
shareholder's stock is not appropriate for some other reason.
3 7
PROVISIONS FOR COMPUTING AND PAYING PURCHASE PRICE
Whether as a result of first option provisions being triggered by proposed
voluntary or actual involuntary transfers or as a result of mandatory or
optional purchases arising upon a shareholder's death, the draftsman of a
shareholders' agreement may be faced with the task of interpreting and
implementing the provisions of his agreement dealing with the computation
34. Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Estate of
O.B. Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958). If the price established by the contractual provision is not
bona fide, it will be ignored for purposes of establishing estate tax value. Treas. Reg. §
20.2031-2(h) (1963).
35. See, e.g., Estate of J.H. Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944); Claire Giannini Hoffman, 2 T.C.
1160 (1943), aff'd, 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 326 U.S. 730 (1945).
36. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303(a). The safe harbor from dividend treatment applies only to
the extent that the redemption price does not exceed the sum of "the estate, inheritance,
legacy and succession taxes (including any interest collected as a part of such taxes) im-
posed because of such decedent's death," id. § 303(a)(1) and "the amount of funeral and
administration expenses allowable as deductions to the estate," id. § 303(a)(2). In addi-
tion, the stock of the corporation must comprise more than 35% of the decendent's gross
estate or more than 50% of his taxable estate if § 303 is to apply. Id. § 303(b)(2).
37. See pp. 241-43 infra.
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and payment of the price at which stock will be purchased. Sometimes this
experience can be embarrassing.
Consider the plight of the attorney who drafted the shareholders'
agreement which became the subject of dispute in The Land and Simmons
Co. v. Arconti3 He had apparently satisfied himself in drafting the
contract that the words "book value ... at the time of his death" ade-
quately defined the purchase price intended to be paid for a shareholder's
stock upon his demise. Imagine his shock when there developed a contra-
versy concerning whether, pursuant to his language, the book value of the
corporation should include the proceeds payable upon a shareholder's death
from insurance policies owned by the corporation covering his life. Imagine
also the chagrin of a lawyer who learns of the death of one of the
shareholders who is a party to a shareholders' agreement which was
prepared some time ago and, after consulting his copy of the agreement,
discovers that the fixed purchase price which he had recommended is now
far below the real value of the corporation's stock, or that, even if the price
is a fair one, the payment terms require installment payments which are
beyond the financial capacity of the purchasing party.
These examples illustrate the problems which can arise when the
purchase price provisions of a shareholders' agreement are not carefully
thought out and meticulously drafted. It is ironic that lawyers who are
extremely careful in the conception and drafting of transfer restrictions and
death buy-out provisions are content to permit the most significant
provisions of the agreement, those dealing with purchase price and payment
thereof, to speak loosely in terms of "book value," "annual installments,"
and the like.
The drafting of these crucial sections of a shareholders' agreement should
be preceded by a thorough analysis of the financial statements of the
corporation and intensive discussions with its shareholders as to their
conceptions of the value of their stock. These activities should be directed
at producing concrete answers to the following questions:
1. What approach to the valuation of the corporation's stock most
accurately reflects the value of the underlying business?
2. How can the valuation approach best provide the flexibility necessary
to adjust to the projected growth or deterioration of the business of the
corporation?
3. What will be the source of funds from which the purchase price will be
paid and, if portions of the purchase price are to be deferred, what level of
installment payments will permit the selling party to receive the purchase
price with reasonable promptness and still will allow the purchasing party
to fulfill its installment obligation without financial hardship?
4. Based upon the business realities at hand and the pertinent income tax
consequences, which party or parties should effect the purchase?
5. Within the context of the valuation approach ultimately chosen, what
assets or liabilities of the business, if any, deserve special treatment?
38. 223 Md. 204, 162 A.2d 478 (1960).
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6. If a portion of the purchase price is deferred, what security, if any,
should be provided to assure the seller that the deferred portion will be paid
and what rate of interest should the purchasing party be required to pay in
return for the seller's willingness to defer receipt of the balance of the price
for his stock?
Most of these questions are not unique to the shareholders' agreement but
reflect the basic thinking which -must be devoted to any agreement for the
purchase of stock. The fundamental distinction, and the factor which
makes valuation a more difficult process in the drafting of shareholders'
agreements, is that most purchases of stock require the determination of a
fair purchase price at the present, while the shareholders' agreement must
provide for that same determination with respect to points of time in the
future.
Although the various considerations in preparing the purchase price
provisions are interrelated and often interdependent, the initial problem
normally is to arrive at the method of valuation which will produce, at any
given future time, the purchase price that best reflects the value of the
underlying business at that point in time.3 9 Usually, the method selected
will depend upon the nature of the business involved. For example, an
approach based upon book value most often will not be appropriate by itself
to reflect the value of a service business having few operating assets. On the
other hand, a multiple of earnings approach by itself cannot accurately
measure the worth of a corporation which owns significant tangible assets
but which produces a low margin of net income from its operations.
In certain cases, the inapplicability of any of the accepted and traditional
valuation methods will necessitate the use of a fixed purchase price stated
in dollars with which the shareholders feel comfortable. However, a fixed
dollar price should be used with caution because of the lack of flexibility
which is inherent in such an approach. Where a fixed price is stipulated,
fluctuations in the financial condition of the company over time can result
in serious inequities. Although the possibility for such inequities can be
limited by a requirement in the agreement that the purchase price be
reviewed every year, difficulties still can ensue.
To begin with, should a disagreement arise among the parties to the
agreement as to a subsequent revaluation, the validity of the agreement it-
self could be impaired and the goals of the agreement thereby frustrated.
Second, if no revaluation occurs because of the inertia of the parties, and
the fixed dollar value becomes unrealistic because of subsequent growth or
deterioration, the party disadvantaged may have a basis for rescinding or
cancelling the agreement. The disadvantaged party may argue that the
re-evaluation process was a condition of the obligations of the parties under
the agreement and those obligations were relieved by the fact that no
revaluation was accomplished. Although such an argument can be
foreclosed at the outset by a clause which specifies that failure to revalue
39. See generally Butala, Valuation of Closely Held Corporations, 7 INST. EST. PLAN. 73.1400
(1973), for a discussion of the valuation techniques frequently employed.
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will not affect the basic obligations of the parties under the agreement, this
solution does not address the basic inequity which may result if no
revaluation is performed.
The disadvantaged party may also base his claim for rescission or
cancellation upon the theories espoused in Helms v. Duckworth.4 ° The
Hel.s..case involved an attempt by the administratrix of the estate of a
deceased shareholder to cancel a stock purchase agreement which would
require her to sell the decedent's stock to the other stockholder of the
corporation at a fixed price which, although fair at the time the
agreement was executed, was far below the value of the stock at the time of
decedent's death. The agreement contained a provision which permitted an
annual redetermination of the purchase price upon the agreement of both
parties, but neither party had requested a redetermination in accordance
with that provision. The administratrix successfully argued that the
surviving shareholder, who was much younger than decedent, had never
intended to consent to a redetermination and that his misrepresentation of
his intent to do so, as evidenced by the appearance of redetermination
provisions in the contract, constituted a breach of the fiduciary duty owed
by the survivor to the decedent.
Although Helms involved certain factual peculiarities which led the court
to its recognition of the survivor's fiduciary transgressions, 4 ' the court's
endorsement of the application of fiduciary principles to the renegotiation
of a fixed purchase price in a shareholders' agreement should give
draftsmen sufficient cause to avoid fixed price provisions wherever possible.
Quite significant here is the court's judgment that the survivor had
breached fiduciary duties even though the decedent had never requested a
redetermination pursuant to the agreement.12 This, together with the
court's emphasis on the survivor's subjective intention not to agree to a
redetermination, even if it had been requested, creates the implication that
the Helms rationale would require a shareholder to initiate redetermination
negotiations even in situations where those negotiations would certainly
result in his obligation to pay a greater purchase price. While Helms prob-
ably reached a fair result based on the peculiar facts involved, it created a
rationale which, when logically extended, could require conduct above and
beyond the call of fiduciary duty.
40. 249 F.2d 482 (D.D.C. 1957).
41. The surviving shareholder had admitted that he had never had any intention of agreeing to
the revaluation of the stock under the agreement. The court found that the survivor had
been under a duty to disclose this intention at the time of the execution of the contract. If
the deceased shareholder had known of this intention at that time, the court reasoned, he
might have refused to execute the agreement or insisted on some other method for
computing purchase price which would be less subject to frustration by bad faith.
42. Compare Krebs v. McDonald, 266 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1953), in which the court ruled that the
widow of a deceased shareholder could not complain about the valuation method under an
agreement whereby the remaining shareholders had the right to purchase the deceased
shareholder's stock, where the deceased shareholder had never objected to the method
during the twenty years the agreement had been in existence; In re Mather's Estate, 410
Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963), in which specific performance was granted under an
agreement requiring a tender of stock at $1.00 per share when the real value of the stock
was at least $1,060.
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The inequities which can result from a fixed purchase price and the
implications raised by Helms militate strongly in favor of a valuation
approach which automatically adjusts the purchase price in proportion to
changes in the fortunes of the business. One such approach is the concept of
book value, the traditional standard for valuing small businesses. Book
value is normally defined as the difference between a corporation's assets
and its liabilities at a given point in time, as evidenced by the corporation's
books of account or by its balance sheet prepared as of that point in time,
and it represents basically the amount which the corporation's shareholders
could expect to receive if the corporation were liquidated at that point in
time, assuming the fair market value of its assets are properly reflected on
its books.43 While this concept appears quite simple, a number of problems
can arise where the book value approach is employed. One of these
problems concerns the timing of a determination based on book value.
Because book value is a balance sheet concept, representing a particular
point in time, it is extremely important that the desired point in time be
carefully chosen. The significance of this factor is clearly illustrated by the
question raised in The Land & Simmons Co. u. Arconti.
In Arconti, the court was required to decide whether the price of the stock
of a deceased shareholder pursuant to an agreement requiring the purchase
of such stock at its "book value.. at the time of his death" should include a
pro rata portion of the proceeds of life insurance owned by the corporation
on the deceased shareholder's life. The court found that such proceeds
should be included in the book value of the corporation for purposes of
computing the purchase price because the corporation became entitled to
receive such proceeds at the time of the shareholder's death. Normally,
corporate owned insurance on the lives of the shareholders is purchased in
order to provide the corporation with funds to finance a death buy-out at a
purchase price which does not include the proceeds of that insurance. If the
use of insurance as a funding mechanism was intended by the parties to the
Arconti agreement, that intent was frustrated by careless draftsmanship. If
book value in the Arconti case had been computed as of a point in time prior
to the deceased shareholder's death, the proceeds would clearly not have
been a part of the corporation's book value, but any cash surrender value of
the insurance would have been so included. The same result could have
been reached by the use of a short clause excluding the insurance proceeds
from the corporation's assets in determining book value. In any case, the
careful draftsman would have clearly resolved the Arconti dilemma one way
or the other.
In most situations where a book value approach is used to compute the
purchase price in a shareholders' agreement, it is desirable that book value
43. Once the corporation's book value has been determined, the book value of the share held
by each shareholder is computed according to the proportions at which their respective
shares would participate in the corporations assets at liquidation. For example, if all stock
was common stock of one class, the book value of each share could be arrived at by dividing
the total number of issued and outstanding shares into the book value of the corporation as
a whole. If preferred stock is outstanding, the par value of the preferred stock is subtracted
prior to the allocation of book value to common stock.
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be measured as of a point in time which is reasonably close to the event
which triggers the purchase. This practice limits the amount of fluctuation
which may occur in book value between the time of valuation and the event
resulting in a purchase. Often it is convenient and economical to determine
book value as of the nearest date, prior or subsequent to the triggering
event, for which financial statements will be available pursuant to normal
corporate practices. Where monthly or quarterly statements are a common
practice, such timing affords little danger of fluctuation. But, where
statements are prepared only on an annual basis, it is possible for
significant periods to intervene between the triggering event and the
valuation date, thereby increasing the possibility for a significant change in
book value during that interval. In the latter case, the increased danger of
fluctuation probably is not justified by the relatively minor savings in effort
and accounting expenses which would be realized.
Before the draftsman can be satisfied with book value as his exclusive
valuation concept, he must examine the financial statements of the
corporation to make certain the value of the corporation's assets as stated
therein fairly represents their market value. In many cases, the corporation
may own real estate or other property which has appreciated in value
substantially since its acquisition, but which is carried on the books at its
acquisition cost less any available depreciation. Where this is the case, book
value can be adjusted in the agreement to reflect the fair market value of
such appreciated property by substituting the results of an appraisal of that
property, conducted as of the valuation date, for its book value as of that
date. Similarly, any marketable securities owned by the )corporation
normally should be valued at their market values rather than their book
value. The draftsman should also explore the methods of depreciation being
used by the corporation to determine if the book value of any depreciable
asset is below fair market value as a result of the use of accelerated
depreciation methods. Where this has occurred, an adjustment to the
reserve for depreciation applicable to each such asset can be made in the
agreement to show the value of the assets less depreciation on a
straight-line basis or such other basis as may be appropriate. If the
corporation has set up on its books as liabilities reserves for future
contingencies which may not occur, an adjustment causing such reserves to
revert to surplus may also be appropriate. Although good will is automati-
cally ignored if a book value approach is used, unless the corporation is
carrying a good will entry on its books from a prior acquisition of a going
business or for some other reason, it often adds clarit' to the valuation
process to add a clause expressly excluding good will, except such good will
as may already be carried on the books. Also for purposes of clarity, a clause
specifying the treatment of insurance proceeds on the life of a deceased
shareholder is advisable, even though the desired treatment may appear
indicated by the fixing of the valuation date.
4 4
A second valuation method which provides desirable flexibility is the
earnings method. While the book value approach basically reflects the re-
44. Such a clause would have avoided the problem in Arconti.
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turn which a shareholder would realize upon a liquidation of the corporation,
the valuation of a business based upon its production of earnings, concep-
tually at least, is more representative of its value to the shareholder as an
ongoing enterprise. Valuation of a corporation's stock on the basis of earn-
ings normally involves two steps: first, some method must be arrived at for
determining the level of earnings which fairly represents the corporation's
actual earnings potential; second, the parties must agree upon a multiple
which, when applied to this representative level of corporate earnings, will
provide a selling shareholder with a fair return for his relinquishment of
future participation in those earnings upon the sale of his stock. Once these
steps are complete, the computation of the purchase price for each share
of stock is a simple arithmetic exercise; however, both steps entail special
problems.
The most accurate level of earnings for purposes, of the future valuation of
stock is, in most cases, an average of earnings for several years prior to the
date of valuation. The use of an average level of earnings, as opposed to the
level of earnings for a single year, is especially appropriate in the small cor-
poration because of the propensity of smaller businesses to have fluctu-
ating earnings from year to year. Where a business historically has shown a
distinct upward or downward trend in its earnings, an average of earnings
weighted in favor of the most recent years preceding sale may be more ac-
curate.
In fixing a fair method for determining a representative earnings level, it
is quite important that earnings be carefully defined. Earnings are normally
defined in terms of the amount of income which is available, after the
appropriate deduction for federal, state and local corporate income taxes,
for the payment of dividends or for use within the corporation. So
that the definition of earnings more fairly depicts the result of operations,
certain adjustments are often appropriate.
The first type of adjustment takes into account the reality, common in
many closely held corporations, that the shareholders of the corporation are
also its principal employees and that their compensation is often greater
than the compensation which would be required to retain an outsider to
perform comparable employment obligations. Where this reality exists,
some downward adjustment in the compensation of shareholder-employees
is necessary if the definition of earnings is to accurately reflect the earnings
potential of the business. Where fixed assets are written off pursuant to an
accelerated method of depreciation, an adjustment to provide for deprecia-
tion on a straight-line basis is usually desirable to produce an accurate
earnings picture. Adjustment should also be made for income or loss which
results from extraordinary transactions, such as the sale of capital assets,
which are extraneous to normal business operations. In situations where
operating assets are owned by the shareholders individually or by an
affiliated partnership or corporation, and leased to the corporation, the
rents paid by the corporation pursuant to these lease arrangements, which
are a deduction from earnings, should be carefully examined to determine
whether they correspond to rates of rental at which such assets could be
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leased on the open market. If such rates do not correspond with market
rentals they can be adjusted to avoid distortions in the earnings picture.
Other transactions between the corporation and its shareholders or affili-
ated entities should also be scrutinized to determine whether adjustment
is necessary or appropriate to an objective definition of the earnings of the
corporation.
After a satisfactory earnings level has been established, the parties to the
agreement must strike upon an equally satisfactory multiple for capitaliz-
ing that earnings level to reach a final value upon which the purchase price
will be based. This final factor is highly intangible. Theoretically, the capi-
talization factor should be the product of the shareholders' desired rate of
annual return on their investment. As a practical matter, however, the capi-
talization multiple will depend upon the subjective expectations of the
shareholders as to the prospect of continued future earnings; if the proba-
bility of continued earnings is considered high, the multiple will be corre-
spondingly high, and vice versa. Thus, the determination of the appropriate
multiple will depend upon the result of negotiations among the parties to
the agreement as to the reliability of projected corporate earnings.
The two fundamental methods of valuation are by no means mutually
exclusive, and a combination of the two methods is frequently employed.
Conceptually at least, a reasonable price would seem to be one which gives
the shareholder compensation both for the value which a liquidation would
produce and for the future earnings which he will relinquish. Consequently,
in many situations, a book value approach can be properly complemented
by an increment representing a factor of earnings.
In the final analysis, however, the various approaches to valuation for
purposes of computing purchase price, although they are significant for
purposes of providing flexibility in the future and for properly compensat-
ing the shareholders, must be reconciled with one very important
factor-the ability of the purchasing party to come up with sufficient funds
to pay the price which is agreed upon. Although steps can be taken to
maximize funding, as will be illustrated later, the key to a successful
purchase arrangement is to properly balance the desire of each shareholder
to receive a fair price if his shares are purchased and his desire to effect a
purchase of the shares of other shareholders without undue financial
hardship to the corporation or the remaining shareholders.
One of the initial steps in maximizing the funding of a purchase is to
select the proper purchasing party. In most situations, the parties to a
shareholders' agreement have the option to name either the corporation or
the remaining shareholders as the purchasing party. Unless the sharehold-
ers are persons having significant assets outside the corporation, the option
is usually decided in favor of a corporate redemption of shares upon the
occurrence of the triggering events. This is usually the case even where life
insurance is used to fund purchase obligations, since cash will be required to
pay premiums and, ultimately, to pay whatever portion of the purchase
price is not covered by insurance. Further, even if life insurance funding is
employed, the insurance proceeds would not be available if the triggering
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event is some occurrence other than a shareholder's death.4 5 The cash
produced by the corporation's operations is normally the most likely source
of funds for the payment of life insurance premiums and for the payment of
uninsured portions of purchase price. Although those funds could be
distributed to the shareholders for the purpose of funding a cross-purchase
arrangement among shareholders, their distribution would cause serious
dilution of the amounts made so available since dividend treatment with
its double tax bite would ensue. Because the corporation is the most likely
source of funding and because it can use, for purposes of such funding, dol-
lars which have been taxed only once, it is usually relied on in the close
corporation context as the principal purchaser. Where more than two
shareholders are involved, use of the corporation as the primary purchaser
facilitates life insurance funding in that it avoids the maze of life insurance
policies which would result in a cross-purchase arrangement. The corpora-
tion need own only one policy on each shareholder's life, while each
shareholder in a cross-purchase agreement must own policies on the life of
each other shareholder.
Use of the corporation as the sole purchasing party, however, has certain
drawbacks. First, statutory restrictions can preclude or inhibit the ability of
the corporation to ultimately effect the desired purchase.46 The restriction
which causes the most difficulty is the statutory requirement that shares
cannot be purchased except out of surplus.4" Although the impact of the
surplus restriction can be softened by a clause in the agreement requiring
the corporation and the remaining shareholders to reduce stated capital to
create additional surplus if necessary48 or by the availability of life
insurance to increase surplus where death is the triggering event, it
nonetheless creates a finite limit for corporate purchases which can
frustrate the fundamental goals of the shareholders' agreement. The only
sure solution to the surplus problem is the addition of the remaining
shareholders as secondary purchasers of any shares which the corporation
cannot purchase due to insufficient surplus.
The use of the remaining shareholders as secondary purchasers also
provides greater flexibility to meet other special problems. For example, in
the family owned business, the possibility that the purchase price will be
treated as a dividend for tax purposes as a result of the application of the
rules of attribution49 can be avoided by requiring the remaining sharehold-
ers to purchase all shares in excess of those which can be purchased without
dividend consequences pursuant to Section 303 of the Internal Revenue
Code.5" Where the first option method of transfer restriction is employed,
giving secondary options to the remaining shareholders can maximize the
alternatives available if the restriction must subsequently be enforced. For
45. If whole life insurance is used, however, the cash surrender value of the policies is available
as funding assistance.
46. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 32 (1973).
47. Id. § 32(b)(3).
48. See generally id. §§ 34-36, for the statutory requirements for reducing stated capital.
49. See pp. 242-43 infra.
50. See pp. 222-24 supra.
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example, if a shareholder's proposed transfer to a third party triggers the
option procedure at a time when funds are scarce at the corporate level, the
secondary options of the shareholders can be employed to purchase all or
part of stock proposed for transfer thereby keeping it within the existing
shareholder group without causing serious financial hardship for the
corporation.
Once the most appropriate purchasing party has been determined, the
possible sources of funds available to that party for the payment of the
purchase price must be explored. Few closely held corporations have
sufficient cash to make payment in full for stock which is purchased
pursuant to a shareholders' agreement without a fatal impairment of
working capital. By the same token, few shareholders of such corporations
have sufficient liquidity to effect such a cash buy-out. Two methods are
used, normally in combination, to facilitate the funding process. The first
method is the deferral of a substantial portion of the purchase price so that
it can be paid in installments out of future earnings or income over a period
of time.5 ' The second method is to purchase insurance on the lives of the
shareholders. Although premiums paid by the corporation for insurance
acquired to fund purchase obligations are not tax deductible,52 this
drawback is more than outweighed by the availability of significant
amounts of tax free proceeds to fund a death buy-out. 53 While the life
insurance method achieves its most dramatic results by making insurance
proceeds available to fund a death buy-out, it can, through the use of whole
life insurance, produce cash surrender values which, when withdrawn or
borrowed against, can provide funding assistance on a more modest basis
when the purchase is triggered by an event other than death.
These funding methods should not, however, be employed without care-
ful consideration. The value of large amounts of life insurance proceeds as a
source of funds must be weighed carefully against the ability of the
purchasing party to pay the large premiums which are required to produce
such substantial proceeds. By the same token, the attractiveness of a long
pay-out period must be balanced against the natural desire of a selling
shareholder to receive, or have his estate receive, the purchase price for his
shares within a reasonable period of time, without serious erosion by
inflation.
51. In employing the deferral method of funding, two tax considerations should be kept in
mind. First, if interest on the deferred portion of the purchase price is charged at a rate less
than 4% per annum, interest will be imputed at the rate of 5% per annum, thereby
converting a portion of the purchase price to interest for income tax purposes. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 483; Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1 (1966). This converted portion of the purchase
price will be deductible to the purchaser and be ordinary income to the selling shareholder.
Second, if more than 30% of the purchase price is paid during the calendar year in which
the purchase occurred, the selling shareholder will not be able to report his gain on the
installment basis and will be obliged to recognize the entire gain in the year of the
purchase. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453. This latter consideration is normally not
significant in purchases triggered by the death of a shareholder, since the increase in basis
of the shares in the hands of his estate will result in little or no gain to the estate from the
purchase.
52. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 264(a).
53. See id. § 101(a).
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The final problem in drafting provisions dealing with purchase price is to
determine what, if any, security should be provided the selling shareholder,
or his estate, to ensure payment of the deferred portion of the purchase
price. The need for such security will vary depending upon a number of
factors, including the financial stability of the business, the size of the
deferred portion of the purchase price and the length of the pay-out period.
The methods of providing security are those normally called upon to secure
the repayment of third party loans made to small businesses, since the
deferred portion of the price has, in economic terms, been borrowed from
the selling shareholder or his estate.
The personal guarantees of the remaining shareholders are the simplest
and most logical source of security where the corporation is the purchasing
party, but shareholders who view themselves in the role of the survivors in a
buy-out situation are often reluctant to increase their personal liability for
corporate obligations. The assets of the corporation are potential collateral
where the corporation is the purchaser, but in many cases these assets may
already be encumbered by purchase money liens or general liens to secure
working capital loans. Finally, the selling shareholder may be offered a
security interest in the shares which have been purchased from him as
collateral for the unpaid portion of the purchase price. Although these
shares undoubtedly would be of little value in situations where a default in
the payment of the deferred portion arose from the financial difficulty of the
corporation, the voting power which they represent could be extremely
valuable where non-payment results from bad faith on the part of the
surviving shareholders. The choice of the proper method of securing the
balance of the purchase price rests ultimately with the shareholders who are
parties to the agreement.
SPECIAL SITUATIONS
The draftsman of a shareholders' agreement for a closely held corporation
may encounter situations which raise special problems in the planning and
drafting of a successful agreement. Unless these special problems can be
recognized and properly dealt with, they can effect significant distortions
which can substantially interfere with the basic purposes of the agreement.
Subchapter S Corporations
A corporation which has elected to be taxed as a "small business
corporation" under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code54 will,
because of the application of the income tax rules unique to such a
corporation, offer potential problems to the draftsman which he would not
encounter with the conventional corporation.
The first such problem arises from the fact that, under the provisions of
Subchapter S, individual shareholders can, by their unilateral act, cause
54. Id. §§ 1371-79.
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the corporation to lose its Subchapter S status.5 5 A shareholder's grant of a
single share of stock to a trust will, for example, result in disqualification.
Likewise, a transfer of shares to a new shareholder who fails to consent to
the election within a specified period of time following his receipt of the
transferred shares will also cause automatic termination of Subchapter S
status. A shareholder can also cause disqualification by transferring shares
to a number of shareholders, thereby causing the total number of share-
holders to exceed the statutory limit of 10. If a shareholder dies, the failure
of his executors to conseni to the corporation's Subchapter S election
within the specified time will also result in termination.
The tax effect of such a unilateral termination can be drastic. The
principal benefit of Subchapter S status is that cash can be withdrawn from
the corporation in the form of dividends without the dreaded double tax
effect, since the provisions of Subchapter S impose no tax at the corporate
level, but tax all corporate earnings to its shareholders in basically the same
manner as partnerships.5" Similarly, corporate losses can be offset against
the personal income of its shareholders to the extent of their respective
bases in their stock.5 7 Where Subchapter S status is terminated by one of
the unilateral acts described above, the termination is retroactive to the
beginning of the taxable year of the corporation in which the unilateral
event occurred,5" so that dividend distributions made earlier in the year
under the assumption that they would be taxed only once suddenly become
retroactively double taxed, or conversely, corporate losses which were
counted on to shelter shareholder income suddenly can be set off only
against subsequent corporate income. This drastic effect is magnified when
the unilateral terminating event occurs accidentally and the termination is
not discovered until a tax return of the corporation is audited, perhaps years
later. Once Subchapter S status has been terminated, the corporation
cannot re-elect such status for five years,59 so that a unilateral termination
has the additional effect of depriving the shareholders of Subchapter S
benefits for a significant time in the future.
Further, the retroactive nature of the termination can cause accumulated
corporate earnings from previous years, on which taxes have previously
been paid by the shareholders, to be "locked-in", that is, distributable only
upon payment of a second tax at the shareholder level. This previously
taxed income can, with certain limitations, be distributed tax free at any
time prior to 2/ months after the end of a corporation's last Subchapter S
year; if such income is distributed after that period has expired, it can be
treated like a normal corporate dividend and taxed again to the
shareholders. 65 Consequently, a unilateral act which occurs after the
expiration of 2 '/,' months of a taxable year, by causing termination
55. See id. § 1372(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4 (1969).
56. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1373.
57. Id. § 1374.
58. See id. §§ 1372(c)(1), (3).
59. Id. § 1372(f).
60. Id. § 1375(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a) (1968).
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retroactively to the beginning of that year, effectively prevents the tax free
distribution of previously taxed income.
Thus, it is normally in the best interests of the parties to a shareholders'
agreement for a Subchapter S corporation to include provisions directed at
preventing or punishing a shareholder's unilateral act which will cause
termination of Subchapter S status. Normal restrictions against transfer
are not a sufficient deterrent since Subchapter S status can be terminated
by a disqualifying transfer in violation of the restrictions, leaving the
remaining shareholders and the corporation with the unenviable task of
proving that loss of Subchapter S benefits are recoverable damages in a
breach of contract action against the transgressing shareholder. For this
reason, normal restrictions should be bolstered by provisions requiring the
transgressing shareholder to indemnify the other shareholders for lost
Subchapter S benefits caused by his unilateral disqualifying act. Further,
the normal provisions calling for the purchase of the stock of a deceased
shareholder do not prevent termination of Subchapter S status by his
estate's failure to consent, since those provisions cannot be implemented
until after the estate has become a shareholder. Thus, the normal death
provisions should be complemented by a provision directing the sharehold-
er's executors to execute a timely consent and requiring indemnity from the
estate for their failure to do so.
It is also advisable to include a provision whereby the shareholders agree
to abide by the decision of the corporation's board of directors or the
majority decision of the shareholders to voluntarily revoke the election.
Because a voluntary revocation must be unanimously approved by the
shareholders, 6 1 the absence of such a provision could permit a single
shareholder to veto a revocation dictated by sound tax planning considera-
tions.
The application of Subchapter S can also cause distortions with respect
to the purchase price computations of a shareholders' agreement. One type
of distortion arises from the requirement that all taxable corporate income
of a Subchapter S corporation for a given fiscal year which is not distributed
in the form of dividends during that year is taxed directly to the
corporation's shareholders in proportion to their stockholdings as of the last
day of that fiscal year.62 In the event of a purchase by the corporation
pursuant to the shareholders' agreement, the shareholder whose shares are
purchased will not be a shareholder of the corporation on the last day of the
taxable year in which the purchase takes place, unless the closing by chance
falls on that day. As a result, the outgoing shareholder as part of the
purchase price will normally receive his share of the corporation's earnings
accumulated from the beginning of the year up to the date as of which the
purchase price is computed,6 3 but he will not be subject to any income tax
61. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e)(2).
62. Id. § 1373.
63. If the purchase price is based on book value, the earnings of the corporation to date will by
definition be included in the purchase price.
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on those earnings, except to the extent that he recognizes a capital gain
from the transaction. Because undistributed income is not reduced under
the Subchapter S rules by a distribution in redemption of stock, the
outgoing shareholder's share of these earnings will show up as undistributed
income at the end of the year and the remaining shareholders, who will
constitute the shareholders of the corporation at year end, will be subject to
income tax thereon. Thus, the remaining shareholders will have "phantom
income" in the year of redemption, that is, they will pay tax on income
which was actually paid out to the outgoing shareholder in the form of
purchase price.
This result is patently unfair to the remaining shareholders. The most
effective way to avoid this result is to include a provision requiring the
corporation to pay a dividend immediately prior to the purchase in an
amount equal to the corporation's estimated net earnings for the elapsed
portion of the taxable year.6 4 This maneuver will have two results: (1) the
outgoing shareholder will be subject to tax at ordinary income tax rates on
the amount of the dividend received by him; and, (2) because the corpora-
tion's undistributed income for the year will be automatically reduced by
the amount of the dividend, the remaining shareholders will realize no
"phantom income" at year end. However, there are practical difficulties
implicit in this solution.
First, there is the obvious problem of accurately estimating the corpora-
tion's net earnings as of the purchase date for the purpose of declaring the
dividend. If the estimate is too low, the dividend will not completely offset
the outgoing shareholder's share of those net earnings, and the remaining
shareholders may realize some phantom income at year end. On the other
hand, if the estimate is high, the outgoing shareholder will get a greater
share of the earnings than he would otherwise be entitled to. The only
solution to this problem is to make the estimate as accurate as possible.
Second, there is the risk that the payment of the dividend will deprive the
corporation of cash needed to withstand the impact of operating losses
which may occur later in the year.
A second purchase price problem caused by Subchapter S status arises
from the concept of "previously taxed income" ("PTI"). The Subchapter S
rules provide that the undistributed income of a "small business corpora-
tion" which is not distributed during the taxable year or within 2' 2 months
thereafter, because it is taxed individually to the shareholders for that year,
can be distributed tax free in later years provided certain prerequisites are
met. 5 For this reason, most Subchapter S corporations maintain bookkeep-
ing accounts within their surplus account showing how much of this PTI has
accumulated and in what proportions the shareholders of the corporation
64. This result would also be avoided by computing the purchase price as of the end of the
previous taxable year. However, such a solution would either deprive the selling
shareholder of his share of all corporate earnings for the period between the previous
year-end and the date of purchase or permit him to avoid the effect of any corporate losses
during such period.
65. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(d); Treas. Reg. 1.1375-4 (1968).
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share in these accumulations. Thus, each shareholder normally has his own
PTI account. The amounts accumulated in these accounts are, in situations
where the shareholdings of a corporation have been constant since the
corporation's Subchapter S election, directly proportionate to sharehold-
ings s6 and the computation of the book value of a shareholder's stock, when
required by a purchase price clause of a shareholders' agreement, will
incorporate his entire PTI account. However, where new stockholders have
been added since the election was filed, the PTI accounts may not be
proportionate to current shareholdings. Where this is the case, the purchase
of the stock of one of the newer shareholders at book value, pursuant to a
shareholders' agreement, will effectively give the newer shareholder an
undeserved portion of the PTI accounts of the older shareholders unless
some provision to the contrary is contained in the agreement. Such a
provision could simply delete the PTI accounts as a whole from computa-
tion of book value and then add back into the purchase price the PTI
account of the selling shareholder.
The PTI concept can result in yet another distortion caused by
Subchapter S. In a book value buy-out of a living shareholder, his PTI
account will be distributed to him as part of purchase price and will be
taxed to him at capital gains rates to the extent the price exceeds his basis,
in spite of the fact that his previously taxed income could have been
distributed to him tax free had he continued to be a shareholder. 7 Since the
shareholder has already paid individual income taxes on the funds in the
account, this additional capital gains tax represents a form of double tax on
these funds. Unfortunately, there seems to be no practical way to avoid this
result other than to provide, in the agreement, that all undistributed
taxable income be distributed each year within 2 /_, months after year end,
thereby precluding the accumulation of any previously taxed income.
Minor distortions can result in the Subchapter S situation where a period
of time elapses between the date of valuation of stock for purposes of a book
value buy-out and the date on which the purchase is actually closed.
Usually, such an interval is provided to give the parties time to compute the
purchase price or in the case of death to collect available life insurance
proceeds and to provide time for the qualification of the executors of the
deceased shareholder. If a year-end occurs during this interval, the selling
shareholder, or his estate, will be a shareholder at year-end and, conse-
quently, will be assessed with income taxes on his share of the undistributed
taxable income for the year, including all such income which may accrue
after the date on which the stock to be purchased has been valued.
Conversely, where losses are incurred during this interval, the selling
shareholder, or his estate, will be able to deduct those losses, but those
66. Because all distributions of income will have been proportionate to shareholdings, the PTI
accounts would necessarily be proportionate.
67. If PTI could be distributed tax free at any time, this result could easily be avoided.
However, Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b) (1968) presumes that any distribution by the
corporation is from current earnings and profits, effectively requiring the distribution of all
current earnings and profits before tax-free distributions of PTI can be accomplished.
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losses will not affect the value of the shares being purchased. While these
distortions could be avoided by valuing the stock on the date the purchase is
consummated, such a procedure is normally impractical because it does not
provide sufficient time to accurately compute the purchase price. The best
way to limit this distortion is to provide for a prompt consummation of the
purchase, thereby avoiding the lapse of any significant period of time within
which the distortions could become material.
A final observation concerning the Subchapter S corporation is that the
direct taxation of corporate income to the shareholders of the corporation
under Subchapter S eliminates one of the major considerations which
normally militates in favor of employing the corporation as the primary
purchaser of stock pursuant to a shareholders' agreement. 8 In the
conventional corporation, shareholders who are purchasers of stock must
frequently use twice-taxed dollars to effect the purchase. Because all
Subchapter S corporate income is only taxed once, it makes no difference
whether the corporation purchases stock directly or the shareholders use
their Subchapter S distributions to do so. The shareholder is taxed on the
income in either case.
Further, the use of the corporation as the purchasing party in the Sub-
chapter S context can result in a problem which is not directly related
to the preparation of the agreement, but which can arise in the aftermath
of the corporate redemption of a deceased shareholder which is funded
by insurance proceeds received by the corporation as a result of the share-
holder's death. As has been pointed out previously, the provisions of Sub-
chapter S permit the tax-free distribution of undistributed income from
prior years which has already been taxed to the shareholders pursuant to
Subchapter S. However, such a distribution of previously taxed income is
tax free to the recipient only if all of the earnings and profits for that fiscal
year have been distributed in the form of dividends.69 Upon the corpora-
tion's receipt of insurance proceeds in the event of a shareholder's death,
the corporation's earnings and profits for that year are increased by the
amount of such proceeds.7 0 However, when the corporation pays out those
proceeds as part of the redemption price for the deceased shareholder's
stock, the earnings and profits for that year will decrease only to the extent
of that portion of the redemption price which is not properly chargeable to
the corporation's capital account. 71 As a result, the transaction can cause a
net increase in the earnings and profits for that year. This artificial net
increase in earnings and profits for the year of redemption can effectively
frustrate an attempted distribution of previously taxed income during that
year, since the distribution of all current earnings from operations will not
exhaust the artificially inflated earnings and profits. Thus, attempted
distributions of previously taxed income during the redemption year, or
68. See pp. 232-33 supra.
69. See note 67 supra.
70. See Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(b) (1955).
71. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312(e); Herbert Enoch, 57 T.C. 781 (1972); Rev. Rul. 70-531,
1970-2 CUM. BULL. 76.
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within 2 '/2 months thereafter, can be rendered taxable to the extent of this
artificially created excess in current earnings and profits. Accordingly,
distributions of previously taxed income should be avoided during the year
of a redemption or during the 21/2 month period thereafter. Unfortunately,
it is possible for a shareholder death to occur after a distribution of previ-
ously taxed income is made, but in the same fiscal year, thus retroactively
destroying the tax free nature of the distribution. This result once again
emphasizes the desirability of avoiding a buildup of previously taxed
income by distributing all income to the shareholders on a current basis.
The Maryland Close Corporation
The Maryland Close Corporation Law,7" enacted in 1967, deserves
specific mention here because of the special recognition which it gives to
transfer restrictions and shareholders' agreements. This statute is probably
best known for its provisions imposing stock transfer restrictions, which
state that no transfer of stock by a shareholder of a corporation covered by
the statute is valid unless written consent to the transfer has been obtained
not more than three months prior to the transfer from all shareholders of the
corporation or unless the transfer is provided for by a shareholders'
agreement authorized by the statute. 73 Although the restrictions are quite
effective to invalidate voluntary transfers in violation of the consent
requirement, they do not cover special situations for which restrictions are
required to maintain the continuity of interest which is the ultimate goal of
all transfer restrictions. For example, the word "transfer" as used in the
restriction section does not include involuntary transfers to executors,
administrators, trustees, receivers, guardians and the like, and does not
include the creation of a security interest in stock which could ultimately
result in a transfer. It also does not include the acquisition of a lien or power
of sale over the stock of a close corporation. However, the restriction section
does effectively preclude the stock from leaving the hands of persons who
acquire it by virtue of transactions not covered by the definition of
"transfer" by making any subsequent foreclosure or transfer by those
persons a "transfer" for purposes of the restrictions. A careful draftsman
will create special sections in a shareholders' agreement for this type of
corporation to cover the situations not embraced by the "transfer" defini-
tion. "
One of the significant problems with the statutory transfer restriction of
the close corporation law is that it permits a shareholder, or a person who
acquired stock in a transaction not defined as a "transfer," to cause a
dissolution of the corporation if consent to a proposed transfer is not
forthcoming or if a transferee provided for in an authorized shareholders'
agreement fails to live up to a purchase obligation. This dissolution right
72. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-11 (1973).
73. Id. § 101.
74. See pp. 214-18 supra.
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will arise "[u]nless otherwise provided by a stockholders' agreement
authorized by" the statute.75 Although the dissolution right is tempered by
a provision in the statute permitting the other shareholders to purchase the
shares of a shareholder who petitions for dissolution, 76 the danger to all
parties posed by the potential dissolution makes it advisable for the
draftsman of a shareholders' agreement for a close corporation to eliminate
the right to dissolution by a specific provision in his agreement.
The section of the Close Corporation Law which specifically authorizes
shareholders' agreements goes beyond the limits imposed by the common
law by granting broad authority to the shareholders to regulate and provide
for virtually all of the situations at which such agreements are generally
directed. 77 Accordingly, it apparently eliminates much of the legal contro-
versy surrounding the validity of shareholders' agreements which attempt
to intrude too extensively into the prerogative of corporate directors in the
areas of management, election of officers, terms of employment of em-
ployees and dividend policy or which attempt to restrict or allocate the
voting power of stock. In addition, this section makes a shareholders'
agreement authorized by its terms automatically binding upon subsequent
shareholders with notice, thereby avoiding the necessity of renegotiating
the agreement with the addition of every new shareholder.
The statutory transfer restrictions and the great flexibility in the
acceptable purposes of shareholder agreements provided by the Close
Corporation Law can, unfortunately, be availed of only at the cost of
subjecting the corporation to the other provisions of the statute, many of
which can be overly restrictive. For example, the flexibility of the
corporation in raising capital is sharply limited by the requirement in the
Close Corporation Law that no new stock may be issued without the
unanimous consent of the shareholders. 7 This limitation may, however,
be qualified in a shareholders' agreement authorized by the statute, and
such qualification should be seriously considered by the draftsman of a close
corporation shareholders' agreement. The ability of a close corporation to
avail itself of favorable opportunities to merge with or be acquired by
another corporation is also severely limited by a requirement that approval
of such an action by the shareholders must be unanimous.79 Unfortunately,
the statute does not permit any qualification of this limitation in a
shareholders' agreement.
Constructive Dividends in Family Corporations
The first concern of any shareholder from whom shares of stock are being
redeemed by a closely held corporation is whether the redemption distribu-
tion will be treated for income tax purposes as a sale or exchange giving rise
75. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 101(b) (1973).
76. Id. § 109(c).
77. Id. § 104.
78. Id. § 102.
79. Id. § 110.
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to capital gain or loss or as the equivalent of a dividerid producing ordinary
income. This question is governed by Section 302 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which creates three basic tests for determining whether or not a re-
demption will be classified as a constructive dividend: first, if the redemp-
tion is not essentially equivalent to a dividend as a subjective matter, it
will be treated as an exchange; second, redemptions which are substan-
tially disproportionate with respect to the shareholdings of the corporation
will be exempt from dividend treatment; and finally, a redemption which
results in the complete termination of the shareholders' interest in the
corporation will not be viewed as a dividend.80
These basic rules come into play in the context of shareholders'
agreements where the agreement contemplates that the corporation will be
the primary purchasing entity for purposes of death buy-outs, first option
transfer restrictions and stock retrieval provisiofts. Under normal circum-
stances, dividend treatment is rarely a problem, since most redemptions
pursuant to a shareholders' agreement will fall within the "termination of
interest" or " substantially disproportionate" categories. However, special
problems can arise where two or more of the shareholders are members of
the same family or entities related to members of that family.
These special problems stem from the fact that, for purposes of Section
302, stock which is held by certain taxpayers who are related to the
shareholder whose stock has been redeemed is "attributed" to that
shareholder, so that he will be deemed to have owned such attributed stock
when the "substantially disproportionate" and "termination of interest"
tests are applied.8 These rules of attribution take two basic forms. The first
type of attribution occurs between members of the same family, while the
second takes place between certain entities and the persons directly
interested in those entities.
The attribution of stock between related parties can have serious tax
consequences to shareholders whose shares are redeemed pursuant to a
shareholders' agreement. Redemptions under the first option or stock re-
trieval provisions of the agreement which would otherwise be substan-
tially disproportionate or terminations of interest can be converted to po-
tential constructive dividends by the attribution of additional stock to the
redeemed shareholder from related shareholders. Further, attribution can
prevent a death redemption from constituting a complete termination of
the deceased shareholder's interest in the corporation. Thus the effect of
attribution is often to remove a redemption transaction from the automatic
exemptions from dividend treatment provided by the "substantially
disproportionate" and "termination of interest" rules and force the
redeemed shareholder to justify the capital nature of the transaction on the
ground that it was not "essentially equivalent to a dividend." Because of
the highly subjective nature of this standard, the draftsman should avoid
80. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b).
81. Id. § 318.
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wherever possible situations which could result in reliance on this standard
to avoid dividend treatment.
2
In cases where the family rules of attribution apply and where, but for the
application of those rules, the redemption would constitute a complete
termination of interest, the rules of attribution are waived if the redeemed
shareholder retains no interest in the corporation, including an interest as
an officer, director or employee, except as a creditor, and does not acquire
an interest in the corporation within ten years after the redemption.8 3 To
obtain this waiver, the redeemed shareholder must file with the Internal
Revenue Service an agreement that he will notify the Service of any such
reacquisition and that he will retain his records relating to the conditions of
waiver. These waiver provisions apply only to the family rules of attribu-
tion, so that the entity rules of attribution can present an incurable barrier
to a successful termination of interest redemption. In the case of a share-
holders' agreement for a family corporation, the redemption of stock from
the estate of a deceased shareholder can cause special problems where the
deceased shareholder's children or spouse are beneficiaries of his estate
as well as shareholders of the family corporation. In such a case, the stock
of the beneficiaries will be attributed to the deceased shareholder's estate
by virtue of the entity rules of attribution, which cannot be waived.8 4 In this
situation, a logical alternative would be to have the corporation redeem the
maximum number of shares exempted from dividend treatment under
Section 303, and have the remaining shareholders purchase the balance. s5
82. Dividend treatment of a redemption from the estate of a deceased shareholder can be
disastrous since it converts what would be an essentially tax-free transaction, because of
the estate's stepped-up basis, into a fully taxable transaction, subject to ordinary income
tax rates.
83. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(c)(2).
84. Until recently, the Service had taken the position that an estate or trust could not properly
waive any attribution rules. See Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 106; Rev. Rul. 72-472,
1972-2 CUM. BULL. 202. However, the result in Lillian M. Crawford, 59 T.C. 830 (1973), has
cast serious doubt on the validity of the Service's position. In Crawford, a corporation
redeemed, pursuant to the provisions of a shareholders' agreement, all of the stock held by
a deceased shareholder's estate and all stock held personally by his wife, who was also the
sole beneficiary of his estate. The sons of the deceased shareholder held the remaining
stock of the corporation. The Service took the position that the redemption from the estate
was essentially equivalent to a dividend because the stock held by the sons could be
attributed to their mother and then to the estate, and because the estate could not waive
attribution between the sons and the mother. The Service did not contest the right of the
mother to waive attribution with respect to the redemption of the shares held personally
by her. The court permitted the estate to successfully waive the family attribution rules,
recognizing that the estate could have avoided the problem by distributing the stock to the
mother prior to redemption and having the mother waive attribution. As a matter of
substance, the court observed, the mother had effected a complete termination of all her
stock, including that to which she was entitled as beneficiary. The Crawford holding still
does not permit, however, waiver of entity rules of attribution in a situation in which the
beneficiaries of an estate remain shareholders after the redemption. In any case, reliance
on Crawford should be tempered by the Service's nonacquiescence in 1974 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 43, at 11.
85. Of course, the estate plan of the deceased shareholder could cause his stock to pass in a
testamentary fashion to his beneficiaries after consummation of the redemption under INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303.
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CONCLUSION
If there is a lesson to be learned from the various problems which have
been discussed in this article, it is that the shareholders' agreement is both
a valuable and complicated component of the planning process for closely
held corporations. Because of its central role in the planning process, its
preparation should be undertaken with the full awareness of the desired
goals to be achieved by its provisions and the careful analysis of the
potential problems incident to successfully attaining those goals. Each
corporation will have different goals and different problems, so that reliance
on a standard form of agreement for all close corporations is extremely
unwise. If carefully conceived and meticulously drafted, a shareholders'
agreement can provide the backbone for corporate planning and the
instrument for resolving many of the conflicting interests implicit in the
relationship between the closely held corporation and its shareholders. If
badly thought out and loosely drafted, a shareholders' agreement can be the
source of problems causing considerable pain for all concerned, including
the draftsman. It is hoped that this article will stimulate a practical
awareness of the potential problem areas inherent in the preparation of this
special type of agreement and thereby obviate some of the hardship which
can result from an unsuccessful agreement.
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